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Intuitive and Reflective Inferences
Abstract
Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning (Evans, 2003, in press; for
arguments against, see Osman, 2004). There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are
characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting features slow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central - that,
depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two
systems. As Evans states in a recent review, “it would then be helpful to have some clear basis for this
distinction”; he also suggests that “we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes”
rather than systems (Evans, in press). We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system
theories. Our goal here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of
inferences: ‘intuitive inference’ and ‘reflective inference’ (or reasoning proper). We ground this distinction
in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important
role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the
main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal
communication (rather than to help individual ratiocination). This function, we claim, helps explain
important aspects of reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support
to this approach.
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Introduction
Experimental evidence on reasoning and decision making has been used to argue both
that human rationality is adequate and that it is defective. The idea that reasoning involves not
one but two mental systems (see Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2004 for
reasoning, and Kahneman & Frederick, 2005 for decision making) makes better sense of this
evidence. ‗System 1‘ reasoning is fast, automatic, and mostly unconscious; it relies on ‗fast
and frugal‘ heuristics (to use Gigerenzer‘s expression, Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research
Group, 1999) offering seemingly effortless conclusions that are generally appropriate in most
settings, but may be faulty, for instance in experimental situations devised to test the limits of
human reasoning abilities. ‗System 2‘ reasoning is slow, consciously controlled and effortful,
but makes it possible to follow normative rules and to overcome the shortcomings of system 1
(Evans & Over, 1996).
The occurrence of both sound and unsound inferences in reasoning experiments and
more generally in everyday human thinking can be explained by the roles played by these two
kinds of processes. Depending on the problem, the context, and the person (the ability for
system 2 reasoning is usually seen as varying widely between individuals, see Stanovich &
West (2000)) either system 1 or system 2 reasoning is more likely to be activated, with
different consequences for people‘s ability to reach the normatively correct solution (Evans,
2006). The two systems can even compete: system 1 suggests an intuitively appealing
response while system 2 tries to inhibit this response and to impose its own norm-guided one.
Much evidence has accumulated in favour of such a dual view of reasoning (Evans,
2003, in press; for arguments against, see Osman, 2004). There is, however, some vagueness
in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are
presented with a bundle of contrasting features—slow/fast, automatic/controlled,
explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central—which, depending on the specific
dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As
Evans states in a recent review, ―it would then be helpful to have some clear basis for this
distinction‖; he also suggests that ―we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2
processes‖ rather than systems (Evans, in press).
We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system theories. Our goal
here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of inferences:
‗intuitive inference‘ and ‗reflective inference‘ (or reasoning proper). We ground this

distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational
modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological
evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to
produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication (rather than to
help individual ratiocination). This function, we claim, helps explain important aspects of
reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support to this
approach.

Inferential processes and massive modularity
Dual process theories stand in contrast to more traditional monistic views that assume
that reasoning is governed by a single system, be it one of rules (Braine, 1990; Rips, 1994), or
mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). At first blush, dual process theories also stand in
contrast to massively modular views of human cognition (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006;
Carruthers, 2006; Sperber, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Massive modularists are neither
monists nor dualists, they are pluralists. They see the human mind as made up of many
specialised modules, each autonomous, each with a distinct phylogenetic and/or ontogenetic
history, and each with its own input conditions, specific procedures, and characteristic
outputs.
In the human case, most innate modules are learning modules (e.g. the language faculty)
and perform their function by using environmental inputs to construct acquired modules (e.g.
the grammar of a particular language). Given the prevalence of these innate learning modules,
massive modularity does not imply massive innateness of mental modules: many or most of
them are the output of an acquisition process. This is not the place to argue in detail for the
massive modularity thesis (but see Sperber, 1994, 2001b, 2005). What we want to do rather is
to explore some implications of the thesis for the psychology of reasoning, and in particular
for the interpretation of the kind of phenomena that has inspired dual process theories.
Massive modularists assume that inferences are carried out not by one or two systems
but by many domain-specific modules that take advantage of the peculiar regularities of their
specific domains to apply inferential procedures that would be inappropriate in other domains.
If, for instance, we had seen two objects being put behind an opaque screen, we are
surprised to see only one object when the screen is lifted (and so are 12-month-old infants,
Wynn, 1992). We expected there would be at least two objects. An expectation is the outcome

of an inference. In drawing this inference (in a typically unconscious manner) we do not use
as a premise the assumption that solid objects persist through time. We passively ignore rather
than actively deny the possibility of their vanishing or blending with one another. This
assumption of persistence is built into a domain-specific mechanism we use to draw
inferences about solid objects. No such assumption is built into the way we draw inferences
about, say, liquids. If we see two liquids being poured in the same opaque vessel, we are not
surprised to discover only one liquid when the content of the vessel is made visible.
Similarly we have different built-in assumptions about the fall of objects and their other
changes of location (Spelke, 1990), about the movement of animate and inanimate objects
respectively (Leslie, 1995), and about the relevance of information unintentionally made
available and that of information intentionally communicated (Sperber & Wilson, 2002).
Massive modularity may seem incompatible with the sense we have that our thinking is
a unitary and integrated process. However, this vague introspective datum is of no serious
evidential value. More relevant is the fact that we can and do reason on premises that pertain
to more than one cognitive domain. For instance, when we see a small child (but not a cat)
sitting on window sill (but not on a low bench), we infer that there is a serious and pressing
danger, unproblematically integrating premises from our knowledge of child psychology and
form our commonsense knowledge of physics. A sensible massive modularity theory must
however assume that the same premise can be processed successively or in parallel by several
modules, just as the same food can be decomposed successively or in parallel by several
enzymes (for a development of the analogy between enzymes and modules suggested in
Sperber 1994, see Barrett, 2005) Multi-domain inferences can be the joint work of several
domain-specific modules.
Fodor (2001) has developed a more serious objection to the idea that human inferences
could be performed by a massively modular mind. Individual modules, by their very nature,
have very little or no context-sensitivity. Human inference on the contrary is characterized by
high context-sensitivity: the same input can yield quite different conclusions in different
contexts. Another way to put the same point is that human inference tends to process not just
any available inputs but only the most relevant ones in the situation, and tends moreover to
contextualise each of these inputs in a way that maximises its relevance. This is arguably a
major feature of human cognition (described in Sperber & Wilson, 1995 as the ―cognitive
principle of relevance‖). If one assumes, as does Fodor, that the operations of modules are
mandatory, in the sense that they automatically process any input that meets their input
condition, then human cognition should be stimulus-driven, with the same stimuli triggering

the same inferences in all contexts, and the output of these inferences triggering the same
higher level inferences in all contexts, and so forth. The high context-sensitivity actually
exhibited by human inferences provides a powerful argument against the view that the human
mind is massively modular in the way envisaged and criticised by Fodor.
In fact, however, it is dubious that any cognitive processes can be considered mandatory
in the intended sense. As studies on attentional blindness demonstrate, even when the
psychophysical conditions for perception are fully met, some outstanding stimuli may remain
unperceived (e.g. a person disguised as a gorilla moving in full view in the middle of a few
basket-ball players; see Simons & Chabris, 1999). Thus even perceptual mechanisms—which
for Fodor are prototypical modules—do not automatically process every input that meets their
input conditions. This is easily explained. Human cognition is characterised by the fact that, at
any moment, it is monitoring the environment and has available in memory much more
information than it could simultaneously process. ‗Attention‘ refers to the dynamic selection
of some of the available information from the environment and from memory for deeper
processing.
From a modularist point of view, attentional selection might be best seen, not as the
output of a distinct attention mechanism allocating resources to specific modules, but as the
result of a process of competition for such resources among modules. Some modules, for
instance danger detectors, may be permanently advantaged in this competition because their
inputs have a high expected relevance. Other modules may be advantaged at a given time
because of a decision to attend to their potential inputs. For instance, face recognition is on
the alert when waiting for a friend at the train station. Leaving aside these permanent bottomup biases and temporary top-down biases, modules with the highest level of immediate
activation both from upstream and downstream modules should be winners in the competition
(with ongoing changes in these levels of activation resulting in shifts of attention).
A competitive system of this type fine-tuned both in phylogenetic evolution and in
individual development would go a long way towards explaining how human cognition can,
in practice, tend toward high context-sensitivity or, equivalently, towards the maximisation of
the relevance of the inputs it processes.
Still, there seem to be some inferential processes that are truly domain-general. For
example, people seem to be able to infer Q from P-or-Q and not-P whatever the content of P
and Q, be it concrete or abstract, factual or imaginary. Similarly, people are able to infer from
X believed that P and X now believes that not-P that X has changed her mind regarding the
subject-matter of P, whatever this subject-matter. Or again, people are capable of inferring

what a speaker means from what she utters, whatever she is talking about. Are these genuine
instances of domain-generality (and therefore of non-modularity)? A more careful
examination of the inferential mechanisms involved reveals that they are as domain-specific
as any other cognitive mechanisms; they just happen to draw inferences warranted by the
properties of a very peculiar kind of objects: conceptual representations.
There is a standard distinction between perceptual mechanisms that have as input
sensory data and as output representations of distal stimuli, and conceptual mechanisms that
have representations both as input and as output. Still, just as perceptual mechanisms are not
drawing inferences about sensory data but about perceived objects, conceptual mechanisms
are not drawing inferences about the properties of the representations they process but about
the properties of the objects or states of affairs represented in these representations. For
instance, inferring from the perceived presence of dark clouds that it will rain is not an
inference about that perception but about the clouds themselves and their likely effects.
Representations, be they mental (e.g. beliefs) or public (e.g. utterances), are also
objects in the world. They have properties qua representations. The belief that it will rain is a
mental representation held by John at a given time and given up by him at another; it may be
consistent or inconsistent with some of his other beliefs; it may be true or false; and so on.
Consistency and truth are properties not of the state of affairs represented but of the belief
itself. Mary‘s utterance is a public representation that may be grammatical or not, relevant or
not, addressed to John or to Jean. These are properties not of the state of affairs talked about
but of the utterance itself. The inference of a conclusion of the form Q from a pair of premises
of the form P-or-Q and not-P is warranted not by the state of affairs described by these
premises but by the formal properties of these representations considered in the abstract.
Humans are aware of the existence of representations in the world, and a good part of
their behaviour is aimed either at influencing the mental representations of others or at
improving their own mental representations. From a modularist point of view, it is sensible to
expect that the special properties of representations (or of specific types of representations)
should be exploited by modules that specialise in drawing inferences about representations.
For this, representations have themselves to be represented by means of second-order
representations, or metarepresentations (see Sperber, 2000b).
Modules that draw inferences about representations are metarepresentational modules.
The representations about which metarepresentational modules draw inferences can
themselves be about any subject-matter within or across any cognitive domains. Inferences
about representations on a given subject-matter may often provide reasons to accept specific

conclusions about that subject-matter. For instance, knowing that a competent meteorologist
believes that it will rain is a reason to believe that it will rain. Or knowing that a set of
premises entails a conclusion is a reason to believe that conclusion if one believes the
premises.
The fact that metarepresentational inferences may indirectly yield conclusions that
belong to the domains of the representations metarepresented results in a semblance of
domain-generality. However, since metarepresentational mechanisms only process specific
properties (e.g. who is entertaining a given representation or what a set of representations
entails) of a specific kind of objects (representations), this is only an indirect and virtual
domain-generality. Metarepresentational modules are as specialized and modular as any other
kind of module. It is just that the domain-specific inferences they perform may result in the
fixation of beliefs in any domain. In this respect, metarepresentational inferences are
comparable to visual or auditory perception. Visual perception mechanisms are highly
specialised and attend to special properties of highly specific optical inputs and yet they may
fixate beliefs in most cognitive domains.
Massive modularity is clearly incompatible with a monistic view of inference: if
inferential procedures are carried out by many different modules using a variety of
procedures, then it is pointless to ask how inference in general is performed or to try to
generalise from the properties of inference in a given domain to all inferential process. For
instance, it could be that spatial reasoning of some kind is performed by means of mental
models but that, nevertheless, mental models play no role in most or even all other inferential
processes. Is massive modularity similarly incompatible with a dualistic view? We will argue
that it is not and that, in fact, a modularist approach provides a principled way to develop such
a view.

Intuitive and reflective inference
Inferential modules alter—and if things go well, improve—the information available to
an individual by adding new beliefs, updating or erasing old ones, or modifying the strength,
or the subjective probability, of existing beliefs. These modifications occur at what Dennett
called the ‗subpersonal‘ level (Dennett, 1969); see also Frankish, this volme) They are the
output of processes that take place inside individuals without being controlled by them. The
modification of the stock of beliefs (or the ‗data base‘) that results from spontaneous

inference occurs without the individual‘s attending to what justifies this modification, just as
in the case of perceptual processes.
As we pointed out, there are different kinds of representations. Some properties are
shared by all representations, others are specific to one given kind. From a modularist point of
view, it is sensible to ask whether the different inferential opportunities offered by various
types of representations are taken advantage of by several distinct metarepresentational
modules. Yet, in the literature, metarepresentational abilities are generally equated with a
single ‗Theory-of-Mind‘, ‗mentalization‘, or ‗mindreading‘ module. ‗Metarepresentational‘
(i.e. about representations) is treated as more or less synonymous with ‗metapsychological‘
(i.e. about mental representations). This is both too broad and too narrow.
It is too broad because some types of attributions of mental states are best performed by
means of specialized inferential routines rather than by a unitary general mindreading ability.
For instance the intention of another person to establish joint attention with you can be
inferred from a fairly simple, possibly repeated, action sequence in which eye contact with
you is followed by staring at the intended target of joint attention. 9-month-old infants are
capable of using this behavioural pattern to attribute an intention of this kind. For this, they do
not use a general mindreading ability but a much more specialised module with, presumably,
a strong genetic basis (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Tomasello, 1999).
Treating ‗metarepresentational‘ as synonymous with ‗metapsychological‘ is also too
narrow since metarepresentations are used to represent not just mental representations but also
public representations, such as utterances (Wilson, 2000), and representations considered in
the abstract, independently of their mental or public instantiations, as in logical or
mathematical reasoning.
There are good evolutionary reasons (discussed in the next section) to make the
assumption that, among metarepresentational modules, there is one specialised in
argumentative relationships among conceptual representations (Sperber, 2000a, 2001a).
Often, we are interested not just in some claim (for instance the claim that it will rain this
afternoon) but also in reasons to accept it (for instance the fact that there are heavy clouds) or
to reject it (for instance the fact that last weather bulletin forecasted clouds but not rain) . This
occurs in two types of situations: somebody is making a claim that would be relevant to us if
it were true but we are not disposed to accept it just on trust, and so we look at reasons to
accept or reject it; or we are trying to convince an interlocutor of a claim that she won‘t accept
just on trust, and therefore we have to give her reasons to accept it.

What the argumentation module does then is to take as input a claim and, possibly,
information relevant to its evaluation, and to produce as output reasons to accept or reject that
claim. The workings of this module are just as opaque as those of any other module, and its
immediate outputs are just as intuitively compelling. We accept as self-evident that a given
pair of accepted assumptions of the form P-or-Q and not-Q justifies accepting the conclusion
P, but this compelling intuition would be hard to justify.1 We accept as self-evident that,
everything else being equal, we are likely to be better off betting on a horse that has won
many races than on a horse that has won few races, but as philosophers since Hume have
argued at length, we would be hard put to justify this type of compelling intuition (see
(Vickers, 1988). Still, the argumentation module provides us with reasons to accept
conclusions, even though we may be unable to articulate why we accept these reasons as
reasons.
The direct output of all inferential modules, including the argumentation module, is
intuitive in the clear sense that we just trust our own mental mechanisms and that we are
disposed to treat as true their output without attending to reasons for this acceptance, or even
without having access to such reasons.
In the case of the argumentation module, however, there is a subtle twist that, if not
properly understood, may cause confusion. The intuitive output of the argumentation module
consists in the representation of a relationship between a conclusion and reasons to accept it.
This representation is produced by a communicator aiming at convincing her audience, and
evaluated by her audience unwilling to be convinced without good grounds. Here, for reasons
of space, we consider only the audience‘s perspective. For the audience, intuitively accepting
the direct output of the argumentation module, that is the representation of an argumentconclusion relationship, provides explicit reasons to accept on its own the conclusion
embedded in it. The acceptance of this embedded conclusion, when it occurs, is an indirect
output of the argumentation module.
At the level of personal psychology, there is a major difference between intuitively
accepting some representation as a fact, and accepting some claim because of explicit reasons.
In the second case only, do we experience engaging in a mental act that results in a conscious
decision to accept. At the level of subpersonal cognitive psychology, disembedding a
1

Arguing that the inference is justified by the logical properties of the connectives ‗or‘ and ‗not‘ is not enough.
Arthur Prior has imagined a connective, ‗tonk‘, defined by two rules: (1) [P(P tonk Q)]; (2) [(P tonk Q)  Q].
With ‗tonk‘, one may then infer any proposition Q from any proposition P. This is of course inacceptable and
illustrates the point that only appropriate connectives permit sound inferences. This in turn raises the difficult
question of what makes a connective appropriate (see (Bonnay & Simmenauer, 2005; Engel, 2006; Prior, 1960)

conclusion from the argument that justifies it is not, properly speaking, an inferential
operation—it does not result in a new conclusion—but a data-management one. It allows a
conclusion that has already been derived to be stored and used on its own.2 What, at a
personal level, looks like a decision to accept a conclusion, is, we suggest, realised at the
subpersonal level by this data-management operation. This indirect output of the
argumentation module—the disembedded conclusion—is quite unlike the direct output of this
and all of other inferential modules in that we mentally represent a reason to accept it.
Conclusions accepted for a reason are not intuitive but are, we will say, ‗reflective‘ (Sperber,
1997) and the mental act of accepting a reflective conclusion through an examination of the
reasons one has to do so is an act of reflection.3
There is thus, within a massive-modularist framework, a subtle but unambiguous way to
distinguish two categories of inferences: intuitive inferences the conclusion of which are the
direct output of all inferential modules (including the argumentation module), and reflective
inferences the conclusions of which are an indirect output embedded in the direct output the
argumentation module. Since reflective inferences involve the representation of reasons, they
well deserve the name of reasoning proper.
In this perspective, the sense we have that reasoning is a slow and effortful mental
process does not come from the difficulty of the individual reflective steps involved, but from
the fact that typical reasoning involves a series of such reflective steps. The conclusion
embedded in an output of the argumentation module is disembedded and used as part of the
input for another operation of the same module, and this can be reiterated many times. The
difficulty of reasoning comes from the attentional or ‗concentration‘ effort needed to maintain
long enoughan expectation of relevance strong enough to keep the argumentation module
active throughout this series of steps when other modules are competing for energetic
resources. A deliberate reiterated use of a perception module, for instance of the face
recognition module when looking for a specific face in a crowd, is also slow and effortful
without this implying in any way that the basic mechanism involved is non-modular.
It is tempting at this stage to equate system 1 reasoning with intuitive inferences and
system 2 reasoning with reflective inferences. Some analogies seem obvious. Both system 2
and reflective inference are characterised by control, effortfulness, explicitness and, (at least
2

Dan Sperber (1985, chapter 2) has suggested that there are conditions of intelligibility on such disembeddings
and that poorly understood conclusions are stored inside their validating context and not on their own.
3
Several philosophers (Cohen, 1992; Engel, 2000; Stalnaker, 1984; see also de Sousa, 1971; Dennett, 1981)
have proposed a contrast between belief and acceptance that is interestingly similar to ours between intuitive and
reflective conclusions.

virtual) domain-generality. They contrast in all these respects with system 1 and with intuitive
inference.
There are also important disanalogies between the two ways of partitioning inferences.
To begin with, the intuitive/reflective contrast is not one between two systems operating at the
same level. Intuitive inferences are the direct output of many different modules. Reflective
inferences are an indirect output of one of these modules. Hence, there are two ways to pell
out the contrast. One may contrast the whole cognitive system, which delivers intuitive
inferences through its many component subsystems, with one of these subsystems—the
argumentation module—which, like all other inferential modules, directly delivers intuitive
inferences, but which also indirectly delivers reflective inferences. One may also contrast a
variety of processes carried out by different modules in many different ways, with the
processes carried out in a more systematic way by a single one of these modules. These two
ways of spelling out the contrast are of course compatible. They highlight the clear
asymmetry between a first type of inferences—system 1 or intuitive—found in all animals
endowed with rich enough cognitive systems, and a second type of inferences—system 2 or
reflective—that may well be absent in non-human animals and that, even in humans, are used
much more sparingly than the first type.
The argumentation module, being an ordinary module (different from other modules
just as every module is different from all the others), shares to a greater or lesser extent many
properties with many other modules. In particular, rather than being unique in requiring high
attention (at least when its operations are reiterated in an inferential chain), the argumentation
module may just stand towards one end of a particular gradient on which all modules are
situated, a gradient defined by the respective role of bottom-up and top-down triggering
factors in the activation of the module.
Some modules—we have mentioned danger detectors—have an inbuilt expectation of
relevance and get activated in a bottom-up way. Our rich cognitive lives are possible,
however, only to the extent that stimuli capable of pre-empting attention the way dangerdetectors do do not occur too frequently in our environment. The full activation of most
modules depends on a combination of bottom-up and top-down factors of attention. Consider
for instance the detection of mood on the basis of facial cues. In ordinary social life, we are
often surrounded by many people with different moods, but typically we pay attention only to
the moods of some individuals who particularly matter to us, either in a relatively permanent
way, or because of our interaction with them at that moment. So, modern humans can live in

an urban environment and encounter new faces continually without having their attention
preempted by these stimuli, even if they have dedicated modules to interpret them.
The fact that the full activation of modules depends to a greater or lesser extent on topdown control of attention does not mean at all that we choose consciously which modules to
activate. After all, we are not even aware of the existence of our mental modules (or else the
modularity thesis would not be controversial). What it means is that, by attending in a more or
less voluntary way to some possible inputs and not to others, we modify their relative ease of
processing (those that are already being attended to requiring less processing effort), thereby
increasing their expected relevance (which is an inverse function of expected effort), and
thereby the probability of their being fully processed by specific modules. So, the
argumentation module is not unique in being much less dependent on bottom-up than on topdown factors of activation, even if it is likely to be towards one end of this particular gradient.
One consequence of this relative and indirect controllability, is that the argumentation module
should exhibit greater individual and situational variations than modules at the other extreme
of the gradient. Another consequence of controllability is that the outputs of the
argumentation module are particularly likely to be consciously attended.
As we already suggested, outputs of modules—unlike modular processes—may be
conscious. They are particularly likely to be so when the process of which they are an output
results from controlled attention, as in the case of reasoning proper. Moreover, since
reasoning takes the form of a series of inferential steps the output of each of which consists in
a justification for inferring a given conclusion, reasoning may appear to consciousness as a
series of epistemically justified operations performed on explicit representations. This
conscious representation of reasoning is partly misleading: what appears to consciousness is
at best the series of intermediate and final conclusions with their justification, that is, a
derivation in the formal, abstract sense of the term of the ultimate conclusion from the initial
premises, and not a derivation in the concrete sense of a process with a series of subprocesses, (a distinction underscored by (Harman, 1986). Moreover, quite often, some of the
intermediate steps may not be consciously entertained at all, so that the derivation is in fact
enthymematic. Our approach thus clarifies in what interesting but limited sense reflective
inference, or ‗system 2 reasoning‘, may seem conscious, in contrast with intuitive inference or
‗system 1 reasoning‘. This approach does not suggest that ‗consciousness‘ as such enables
reflective inference or plays a causal role in it.

The function of reflective inference
General considerations and experimental evidence give us good reasons to distinguish
two types of inferential processes, be they described as system 1 and system 2 reasoning or as
intuitive and reflective inference. Still, one would want such a distinction to provide more
novel theoretical insights, allow more new analyses of available evidence, and suggest more
ground-breaking experimental research than it has done so far.
In this search for greater theoretical and empirical import, it should be fruitful to
consider the different functions of these two types of inference, and in particular of reflective
inference (the general function of intuitive inference is, we take it, better understood;
interesting issues at that level have to do rather with the function of individual domainspecific modules). We assume that these forms of inference are evolved capacities, or at least
capacities for the development of which there is an evolved disposition. Ernst Mayr‘s oft
quoted remark is relevant here (extending his point from physiology to psychology): ―The
adaptationist question, ‗What is the function of a given structure or organ?‘ has been for
centuries the basis for every advance in physiology.‖ (Mayr, 1983, p.328). So what, if
anything, made the structures underlying different forms of inference advantageous over
evolutionary time? The founders of dual system theory have proposed at best cursory answers
to this question.
In his 1996 article, Steven Sloman alluded to the question of the two systems‘ function.
He offered two suggestions: the first is that ―the systems serve complementary functions. The
associative system is able to draw on statistical structure, whereas a system that specializes in
analysis and abstraction is able to focus on relevant features.‖ The second suggestion draws
on Freudian psychology: on the one hand, the pain principle motivates us to seek gratification
and avoid pain (system 1); on the other hand, we sometimes have to repress these impulses
because gratification would otherwise escape us (system 2).
In their book on dual system theory, Jonathan Evans and David Over state that
―consciousness [i.e. system 2 reasoning] gives us the possibility to deal with novelty and to
anticipate the future‖ (Evans & Over, 1996, p.154). In a more recent article, Evans says that
―interesting though such [evolutionary] speculations are, they may seem to have little
immediate relevance to thinking and reasoning researchers attempting to account for the
results of their experiments‖ (Evans, 2006).
In The Robot’s Rebellion, Keith Stanovich offers a somewhat more elaborate
evolutionary account. He states that system 2 is ―where the genes gave up direct control and

instead said (metaphorically, by the types of phenotypic effect that they created) ‗things will
be changing too fast out there, brain, for us to tell you exactly what to do—you just go ahead
and do what you think is best given the general goals (survival, sexual reproduction) that we
have inserted.‘‖ (Stanovich, 2004). He claims that system 1 reasoning is built by our genes to
serve them directly by way of contextualized rules of the form: when in situation X, do Y
(because it tends to maximize fitness). By contrast, system 2 reasoning is built to favour the
individual. To that end, it should be able to fight some of the urges of system 1, by being
decontextualized (so that it can find solutions that are not so context-dependent) and by
having a strong inhibitory power.
These three views on the evolution and function of system 2 reasoning concur in
seeing it as a way to compensate for some of the shortcomings of system 1 and to enhance
individual cognition. This is consistent with the view of classical philosophers, Descartes in
particular, according to which reasoning (by which they mean conscious reasoning) is the
only reliable way to acquire knowledge.
There are, however, strong reasons to doubt that conscious or system 2 reasoning—
here we will call it ‗reasoning‘ tout court—evolved to enhance individual cognition. The view
that its function is to permit delaying gratification is puzzling for two reasons. The ability to
delay gratification when it is advantageous to do so is a widespread feature of animal
cognition—in hoarding food for instance—and not a specifically human trait. In humans, the
ability to delay gratification seems to be a personality trait related to emotions and is
dissociated from the ability to reason, as illustrated by the famous story of Phineas Gage and
other better-documented similar cases discussed by Damasio (Damasio, 1994).
The view that the function of reasoning is to enhance the ability to deal with novelty is
not compelling either. Humans tend to accumulate in memory information of no immediate
practical relevance which they can exploit to imagine possible novel situations. This is a more
plausible basis for the ability to deal with novelty. The role of reasoning proper, as opposed to
intuitive inference, in memory and imagination can hardly be described as central.4
The ‗Cartesian‘ view that reasoning is the road to knowledge, or the more cautious
view that the function of reasoning is to enhance cognition are also questionable. The issue is
one of costs and benefits: those of reasoning have to be compared with those intuitive
4

There is one kind of contingency that does call for a special form of reasoning, and that is strategic planning in
social interaction. According to the Machiavellian hypothesis (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten & Byrne, 1997),
this is in fact a driving force in the evolution of mindreading. To what extent it has evolved as a distinct module
(or submodule of mindreading) is an open question. While strategic thinking has features in common with

inference. All theorists agree that reasoning is a relatively slow and costly process. Moreover,
reasoning is difficult and prone to a variety of performance errors. So how might such a
fallible and costly system still be advantageous? By providing a check on the inferences of
system 1? System 1 inferences are on the whole reliable, and it remains to be demonstrated
that checking them by means of reasoning, i.e. correcting some mistakes at a high cost and at
the risk of further mistakes, would be advantageous. Is reasoning advantageous by allowing
the mind to go where it would not intuitively? Many such extensions of the domain of
knowledge that make a crucial use of reasoning come to mind, in the sciences in particular,
but they typically involve social procedures and institutions where only few individuals make
ground-breaking contributions. It is unclear that, at the individual level, the value of reasoning
lies in its opening new intellectual vistas.
As an alternative to the view that the basic function of reasoning is to enhance
individual cognition, we want to explore the hypothesis that reasoning has a primarily social
function and, more specifically, that it is linked to the massive human reliance on
communicated information.
Communication is found in a large number of species. For communication to evolve,
the cost for the communicator of emitting a signal, and the cost for the receiver of responding
to the signal must, on average, be inferior to the benefits. Often, however, the interests of the
communicator and of the receiver do not coincide: communicators commonly have an interest
in deceiving, whereas receivers‘ interest is best served by reliable, honest signals. If dishonest
signals were frequent to the point of making communication disadvantageous to receivers,
receivers would stop responding to them, and emitting these signals would cease to be
advantageous to the communicators too (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). In other words,
communication would be selected out. There is a variety of mechanisms that ensure honest
signalling in animal species. The signal may involve a cost that only an honest signaller is in a
position to incur (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). A peacock, for instance, signals its fitness to
peahens by displaying a magnificent tail, the cost of which could not be supported by an unfit
peacock. Individuals may store information about past communication events and cease to
trust communicators that have proved unreliable. Several species of monkey, for instance, are
known to recognize the vocalizations of different members of their group; if an individual
‗cries wolf‘ (by using a vocalization in a context that does not warrant it), the other members
will soon stop reacting to this individual's vocalizations, or at least to the specific vocalization
standard reasoning, in particular its metarepresentational complexity, we suggest that it is the work of a module
other than the argumentation module.

that has been improperly used (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Gouzoules, Gouzoules, & Miller,
1996).
Non-human animals, however, communicate only very simple information about a
narrow range of matters, so that simple ad hoc mechanisms may evolve to enforce honesty.
Humans, on the other hand, communicate complex information on an unbounded variety of
matters and rely much more on communicated information than any other species. This
reliance, hugely advantageous as it may be, is also a source of vulnerability to misinformation
and deception. In other terms, there has been among humans a strong selective pressure for
ways to filter communicated information so as to come as near as possible to accepting all and
only reliable information. We assume that this pressure has caused not one but a variety of
mechanisms of what may be called ‗epistemic vigilance‘ (Sperber, Clément, Mascaro,
Mercier, Origgi & Wilson, submitted) to evolve. Some of the mechanisms have to do with
selectively trusting or distrusting different sources of information on the basis of what is
otherwise known of their competence and benevolence towards their audience, their past
record in communication, and even behavioural indices of honesty or dishonesty (even if
these are only marginally reliable; see (DePaulo et al., 2003; Ekman, 2001). Other
mechanisms have to do with properties of the information communicated which make it more
or less credible.
A possible way to help calibrate one‘s trust is for the receiver to check the coherence
of what is being said against his own knowledge base. The communicator would then have to
adjust her signals if she wants them to be accepted. One way is to stay within the boundaries
of what the receiver will be willing to accept on trust.5 In some cases however, the
communicator might want to communicate some information that the receiver will not accept
on trust. Here a strategy for the communicator can be to show the receiver how the
information she communicates is in fact coherent with what he already believes—how, in
fact, it would be incoherent for him not to accept it. To show this, the communicator must
present information that the receiver is already disposed to accept or is willing to accept on
trust and that provides premises from which the less easily accepted information follows.
The communicator can moreover highlight the logical or evidential links between the
acceptable premises and the intended conclusion. The receiver will then be in a position to
evaluate the strength or the validity of these links. Why would he put in such effort? First, it
5

To put it another way: when a trusted communicator communicates something that is not totally coherent with
the receiver's beliefs, the receiver has to choose between revising his beliefs regarding the content of what is

should be noted that most of the effort will be on the communicator‘s side: it is advantageous
for her to make her argument as plain, simple and understandable as possible if she wants to
convince the receiver by this means. But the receiver also has something to gain from using a
more selective, finer-grained filtering mechanism. Communicators whose benevolence or
competence in the matter at hand cannot be taken for granted may nevertheless have valuable
information to transmit; it is useful in such cases to be able to bypass or overcome selective
distrust. Also, because one‘s previously held beliefs may be wrong, it can be useful to be able
to go beyond a simple check of coherence with these beliefs.
If this scenario is correct, there may have been selection pressures favouring the
evolution of capacities that allow communicators and receivers to evaluate evidential, logical
and coherence relationships between different pieces of information, i.e. selection pressures
for reflective inference. Reflective inference so understood is geared to deal with specific
problems concerning the acceptance or rejection of claims in communication. The
effectiveness of the argumentation module, like that of any other module, should depend on
the expected relevance of its operations in a given situation. In particular, situations
characterised by the need to convince others or by that of not being too easily convinced
should trigger more efficient reasoning—a prediction quite specific to this approach.

Reasoning and argumentation: some evidence
Abstract vs. argumentative contexts

If our approach is right, reasoning should be more easily triggered in argumentative situations.
We should therefore expect better performances on reasoning tasks where the participants are
placed in such situations. Standard theories make no such prediction. If anything,
argumentative contexts should increase the cognitive load since they involve taking into
account different opinions.
It is now well established that performances on computationally trivial logical
problems can be dismal. As Evans states in his review of the literature on deductive
reasoning: ―it must be said that logical performance in abstract reasoning tasks is generally
quite poor‖ (Evans, 2002, p. 981). The simplest way to compare the abstract context of a
being communicated or revising his trust in the speaker. He will tend to choose the solution that brings less
incoherence, and this will often be to lower trust in the speaker.

classical reasoning experiment with an argumentative context is to get the participants to
discuss the problem in groups.
Among the great many studies on group decision making, the most relevant are those
bearing on problems that have a demonstrably correct answer—and are thus analogous to the
tasks used in most reasoning experiments. It has now been repeatedly shown that, provided
certain minimal conditions are met (the good answer must be accessible to at least one of the
participants for instance), what is observed is that in such contexts, if one of the participants
has the correct answer, then the other members will get to it too. This has been shown for
mathematical tasks (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Stasson, Kameda, Parks, Zimmerman, & Davis,
1991), ‗Eureka‘ problems (in which the correct solution seems obvious in retrospect—
Laughlin, Kerr, Davis, Halff, & Marciniak, 1975), and Mastermind problems (from the board
game—Bonner, Baumann, & Dalal, 2002). In all these cases the performance of groups tends
to be at the level of the best participants taken individually. The experiments carried out by
Moshman and Geil (1998) illustrate this point dramatically. The experimenters had
participants solve the Wason selection task, either first individually and then in groups, or
directly in groups. In both cases, the performance of the groups was impressively higher than
that of the participants who were solving the problem individually: 75% of the groups found
the right answer, compared to 14% in the solitary condition6.
According to the theory advocated here, this dramatic improvement is due to the fact
that when they have to solve the problem in groups, participants have to argue and debate, and
that this activates their reasoning abilities in such a manner that they are able either to come
up with the correct solution, or at least to accept it and reject the incorrect ones.
Of course, this is not the only possible interpretation of these results. An alternative
interpretation might be that the smartest participant gets it right and the others recognize her
competence and accept her answer without reasoning (explanation hinted at by (Oaksford,
Chater, & Grainger, 1999). Another possible interpretation is that the participants are simply
sharing information, and not reasoning. These explanations are hard to reconcile with the
following facts. First of all, information sharing is often insufficient to solve the task. For
example, in the Wason selection task, it will often be the case that a participant has wrongly
selected a card and another has rightly rejected it. In that case, sharing information won‘t do
the trick: participants have conflicting pieces of information, and they have to pick the correct
one. This means that conflicts and debate should occur. An analysis of the transcripts of such
6

A similar effect—if a bit less dramatic—was observed by (Maciejovsky & Budescu, 2007).

experiments will show that such is indeed the case (Moshman & Geil, 1998; Trognon, 1993),
and there is a large literature showing that conflict is often the crucial factor that allows
groups to outperform individuals (see the references in Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch,
Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006). In some cases, conflicts will even lead a group in which no
individual had the correct answer towards it—provided that not everyone makes the same
mistake to start with (this happened in some of the groups studied by Moshman and Geil and
is known in developmental psychology as ―two wrongs make a right‖ (Glachan & Light,
1982; Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000) and as the ―assembly bonus effect‖ in social
psychology (Kerr, Maccoun, & Kramer, 1996). The explanation based on the recognition of
an expert is also hard to reconcile with the presence and importance of such conflicts. One
could even argue that the opposite in fact happens: a person is recognised as an expert
because she uses good arguments—so participants must use reasoning to discern good
arguments in the first place (see Littlepage & Mueller, 1997 for evidence in that direction).
Finally, we can also rule out an explanation based on general motivation: one might
think that participants are more motivated—will make greater effort—to solve any task in
group. This would be quite surprising, however, given the importance of social loafing in
groups (Karau & Williams, 1993). Moreover, if motivation was the problem, it should be
alleviated by monetary incentives. However, in line with the general observation that money
tends to have no effect on performances in decision making tasks (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999),
it has been shown that monetary incentives do not increase the performance in the Wason
selection task (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Jones & Sugden, 2001)—a result in sharp
contrast with the dramatic improvement in group settings.

Biases in reasoning

The biases that plague reasoning provide further evidence in favour of our approach. We
concentrate here on two twin biases that have been reported time and again: the confirmation
bias and the disconfirmation bias. Both biases apply when we have to evaluate a belief or a
hypothesis: instead of objectively evaluating it, we seek to confirm it if we agree with it in the
first place, and to disconfirm it if we don‘t. This can hardly be sanctioned by a normative
theory and is all the more disquieting in that it seems to be extremely widespread: ‗smart‘
people do it (Stanovich & West, 2007), open-minded people do it (Stanovich & West, 2007),
physicians, judges, scientists do it (see Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005; Nickerson, 1998 and
references within). From an argumentative viewpoint, these biases are hardly surprising. In

fact, they could be predicted on the grounds that when we try to persuade someone that
something is true (or false), a confirmation (or disconfirmation) bias may help us achieve our
goal.
The experiment that has done the most to promote the idea of the confirmation bias is
Wason‘s 2,4,6 task (Wason, 1960). In this task, participants have to find the rule governing
the formation of triplets of numbers, knowing that 2,4,6 is such a triplet. They can test their
hypothesis by proposing their own triplets and being told whether they fit the rule.
Participants can propose triplets and suggest tentative rules until they have found the correct
rule or have given up. Participants typically show a strong confirmation bias in using triplets
that conform to their hypothesis in order to test for it rather than triplets that might falsify it
(Tweney, Doherty, Warner, & Pliske, 1980; Wason, 1960). Whether the strategy of the
participant is really non-normative has been debated (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Koehler, 1993),
but two elements point to a real bias and fit with our hypothesis. First, ―psychological
experiments that have strongly instructed participants to take a falsification approach to the
2,4,6 task have in fact had little effect in improving performance (Poletiek, 1996; Tweney,
Doherty, Warner, & Pliske, 1980)‖ (Evans, 2006). If the tendency to confirm wasn‘t a deeprooted bias, these instructions should be much more effective. Even more interestingly, there
seems to exist a simple solution to get participants to use a falsifying strategy: when told that
they were testing someone else‘s hypothesis, participants used the falsifying strategy four
times more often and abandoned the hypothesis sooner (Cowley & Byrne, 2005).7
Just as we tend to confirm claims we agree with, we tend to disconfirm claims that
don‘t fit our views. The classical demonstration of this disconfirmation bias comes from a
study by Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) in which people had to evaluate studies either in
favour or against the death penalty. Participants who supported the death penalty were much
more critical of the study arguing against it, and conversely. It has later been shown that
people not only put in more effort in examining studies whose conclusions they don‘t agree
with: they are strongly biased towards critical thoughts (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Here, too,
urging participants to be objective isn‘t very efficient (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984).
However, when participants are told to imagine that a given study they agree with has in fact
the opposite conclusion, they become quite adept at critically examining it (Lord, Lepper, &
Preston, 1984).
7

Even though due to the limited number of participants this difference failed to reach significance.

Another well-known effect in the psychology of reasoning is the belief bias, thought to
be a consequence of the disconfirmation bias. Some experiments have pitted the believability
of the conclusion of an argument against its logical validity. The main effect is one of
believability: people will tend to use believability instead of validity to judge the argument, a
finding easy to interpret in terms of epistemic vigilance: believability provides a reason to
believe and unbelievability a reason to disbelieve. This effect is stronger for believable
conclusions: with them, validity barely makes a difference. Validity, on the other hand, is
taken into greater account in th case of unbelievable conclusions. It seems then that when the
conclusion of an argument is believable, participants hardly bother to evaluate its validity, but
when it is unbelievable, they try to find the flaw, as they should if what motivates is epistemic
vigilance. When they fail to find any flaw because the argument is valid, they accept it, again,
as they should. Epistemic vigilance is what explains that people are more sensitive to validity
when the conclusion is unbelievable (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Klauer, Musch, &
Naumer, 2000; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992).
In a nutshell, the confirmation, disconfirmation, and believability biases behave much
as the argumentative theory would predict: one cannot suppress them with instructions to be
objective, but if one can get participants to change their mind about the claim to be evaluated,
then the biases can disappear or even be reversed.

Are people good at arguing?

If argumentation has been so important in evolutionary history, then humans should be good
at it. The first large-scale study of the ―skills of argument‖ done by Deanna Kuhn (1991)
concluded, however, that people are rather poor at argumentation. We remain unconvinced for
the following reasons. To begin with, the context of her experiments was quite artificial:
people were asked to argue about topics of which they had very limited knowledge (e.g. the
causes of school failure or of relapse into delinquency after prison) with an experimenter who
wasn‘t really arguing with them. It has later been shown that when participants are more
knowledgeable about the topics they stop making some of the mistakes noted by Kuhn (such
as using explanation—some kind of naive theory— instead of genuine evidence (Brem &
Rips, 2000). More importantly, most of the shortcomings Kuhn attributed to participants were
in fact instances of the confirmation bias: for instance, participants often had trouble finding
alternative theories or rebuttals to their own hypothesis. So they were indeed doing what one
should expect if reasoning was used not to get at the truth but to persuade.

Other studies have since tended to show that participants do possess the skills
necessary to understand and take part in an argument. They can follow the commitments of
the different speakers and determine, at any given point of the argument, who has the burden
of proof (Bailenson & Rips, 1996; Rips, 1998). They understand the macrostructure of
arguments (Ricco, 2003). They are often able to spot the classical fallacies of argumentation,
such as ad hominem, petitio principii (begging the question), or circular reasoning (Neuman,
Glassner, & Weinstock, 2004; Neuman, Weinstock, & Glasner, 2006; Rips, 2002; Weinstock,
Neuman, & Tabak, 2004).
Note that these ‗fallacies‘ can sometimes be quite appropriate – for example, when
someone uses her authority to make a point, then a good ad hominem may be effective.
Oaksford, Hahn and their colleagues have used Bayesian statistics to pinpoint which features
of a given argument make it more or less fallacious (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). For example,
the validity of a slippery slope argument depends—among other things—on the conditional
probability of each step of the slope given the preceding step. Instead of the mere ability to
spot fallacies, a more accurate measure of people‘s argumentative skills is a measure of the fit
between their evaluations of arguments and their actual validity (as indexed by these
statistics). In a set of experiments, these researchers tested these predictions for a set of such
‗fallacies‘: argument from ignorance (Oaksford & Hahn, 2004), slippery slope arguments and
circular reasoning (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006). In all of these experiments, participants‘ ratings
of the strength of different arguments were indeed correlated with factors that reflected the
actual statistical validity of the arguments.
Finally, researchers who have looked at real arguments—between participants
debating for instance—have been ―impressed by the coherence of the reasoning displayed.
Participants … appear to build complex argument and attack structure. People appear to be
capable of recognizing these structures and of effectively attacking their individual
components as well as the argument as a whole‖ (Resnick, Salmon, Zeitz, Wathen, &
Holowchak, 1993). The contrast between these observations and the dismal results of simple
reasoning tasks could not be sharper.

Conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to outline an original view of reasoning, seeing it as an aspect of
social, and more specifically communicative competence. This view is embedded in an

evolutionary psychology framework and in particular in a massive-modularist view of the
human mind. At its core is the distinction between two types of inferences: intuitive
inferences that are the direct output of inferential modules and take place without attention to
reasons for accepting them; and reflective inferences that are an indirect output of a particular
metarepresentational module, the argumentation module, the direct output of which is an
argument for or against a given conclusion. Being a distinction between two types of
inferences, this view has obvious analogies with other dual process accounts of reasoning, but
some serious differences were also noted.
An evolutionary argument was put forward to explain what the function of the
argumentation module might be—namely, to regulate the flow of information among
interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance
on the side of the audience. Testable predictions follow from such an account. We have
argued that some puzzling findings in the psychology of reasoning and state-of-the-art work
in the psychology of argumentation confirm these predictions. Further confirmation will have
to come from novel experiments specifically designed to test these theoretical claims.
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